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PARI PASSU AND A DISTRESSED SOVEREIGN'S
RATIONAL CHOICES
William W. Bratton*
INTRODUCTION

In 1983, the Republic of Peru guaranteed foreign bank borrowings of
Banco de la Nacion and Banco Popular de Peru. Some years later, Peru and
the two banks defaulted on this and much other external debt. Some years later
still, in 1996, most of Peru's bank lenders agreed to a composition. Under this,
the 1983 instruments were exchanged for "Brady Bonds," with the bonds
either stating a reduced principal amount or paying a lower rate of interest. I
Elliott Associates, a holder of the 1983 debt, held out from the
composition, refusing to participate. Elliott, a "vulture fund" specializing in
obligations of distressed firms and countries,2 had purchased $20.7 million face
amount of Peru's 1983 debt at the discounted price of $11.4 million from two
3
international banks while the restructuring negotiations were ongoing. Elliott
brought an action to enforce the debt at face value in the Southern District of
New York, a focal point venue in the emerging world of sovereign debt
enforcement. Legal recourse against defaulting sovereigns is available in the

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This project began in conversations with Mitu
Gulati, who bears no responsibility whatsoever for the assertions made herein. My thanks to David Carlson
for his excellent comments.
I Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 'Il'll I, 8, Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,2(00) (96 Civ. 7916) [hereinafter Lowenfeld Declaration].
2 These hedge funds typically purchase the debt of companies and countries that are in financial distress
and, therefore, hold debt that is trading at a deep discount. Although even the Institute of International
Finance-the global association of financial institutions-has publicly called for a targeted legal strategy to
counter the supposedly disruptive activities of vulture funds in the context of sovereign restructurings, these
funds are not without their supporters. See John Dizard, A Bankrupt Solution to Sovereign Debt, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2002, at 24 (arguing that there is nothing problematic about a vulture fund that purchases sovereign
debt at a deep discount and then sues to be paid in full); Vulture Hunt, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at 20 (arguing
that vulture funds serve to provide much needed liquidity in the markets for distressed sovereign debt). From a
supportive point of view, Elliott's enforcement action respecting Peruvian debt can be analogized to
enforcement of the securities laws by the plaintiff's bar.
3 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1999).
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courts of countries like the United States and the United Kingdom,4 even as
sovereign immunity prevents direct enforcement of sovereign obligations in
the obligors' own courts. Elliott emerged from the Southern District with a
5
judgment of $55,660,831.56. Unfortunately for sovereign creditors in Elliott's
position, such judgments have value only to the extent the creditor can identify
property of the defaulting sovereign in the jurisdiction of the judgment or
another jurisdiction willing to levy execution. Sovereigns in default rarely
leave valuables lying around subject to attachment in creditor-friendly
jurisdictions.
Elliott beat the odds and got paid. It relied on the 1983 debt contract's pari
passu clause, which provided, "The obligations of the Guarantor hereunder do
rank and will rank at least pari passu in priority of payment with all other
External Indebtedness of the Guarantor, and interest thereon.,,6 Elliott took the
clause to Brussels, the home of Euroclear, a clearing house through which
funds from abroad enter the European banking system. Peru was about to
dispatch a large payment on its Brady Bonds to European holders via
Euroclear. Elliott, in an ex parte proceeding, persuaded the Belgian courts to
block the payment on the ground that the pari passu clause gave the holders of
the 1983 debt the right to participate pro rata in Peru's payments to other
7
foreign creditors. Peru, not wishing to default on its Brady Bonds, paid Elliott
s
in full. Since then, vulture investors have successfully repeated the tactic,9
with mixed results. 10

4 The statutes that relax the traditional sovereign immunity barrier are the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.c. §§ 1330, I332(a)(4), 1391(0, 144I(d), 1602-1611 (2000), and the State Immunities Act, 1978,
c. 33 (Eng.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978).
5 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, No. 96 Civ. 7916 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14169
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000); Lowenfeld Declaration, supra note I, '15.
6 Lowenfeld Declaration, supra note I, '119.
7 Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2oo0/QRl92 (Ct. App. of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26,
2000).
8 G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. KIee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 Bus. LAW. 635, 636 (2001).
9 In Belgium, for example, in Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC Investors LLC & Euroclear Bank S.A., the
Commercial Court of Brussels once again issued an injunction, but was reversed in the Cour D' Appel de
Bruxelles in March 2004 on the ground that Euroclear was not a proper party to the litigation.
10 Compare Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 2002 No. 1088 (Commercial Ct. Apr. 16,2003)
(refusing to enjoin sovereign borrower from making payments of external indebtedness without proportional
payment to the plaintiff), affd, 2003 WL 1935493 (C.A. May 13,2003), with Red Mountain Fin., Inc. v.
Democratic Republic of Congo, No. CV 00-0164 R (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2001) (refusing specific performance
of pari passu clause but enjoining sovereign borrower from making payments of external indebtedness without
proportional payment to the plaintiff).
A pending action in respect of Republic of Congo debt uses a pari passu clause to assert a claim of
tortious interference with contract against a later lender who received payments. Kensington In!'1 Ltd. v. BNP
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Elliott pulled off its Belgian caper at an inopportune time. The reading of
the pari passu clause operative in the Belgian decision strengthens the hands of
creditors who withhold consent from sovereign debt compositions. The greater
the potential rewards to dissenters, the harder compositions are to conclude.
The more unstable the composition process, the longer the duration and greater
the intensity of sovereign distress. And in late 2000, at the time of the Belgian
action, there loomed a sovereign debt crisis with a magnitude equaling
emerging market (and particularly Latin American) defaults of the 1930s and
1980s. During the 1990s, emerging market borrowers had turned to the bond
markets to borrow hundreds of billions in dollars and other currencies. II By
12
2000, market demand had fallen dramatically as fear of distress intensified.
Argentina was on the brink of default, which followed in 2001. In 2004,
13
Argentina's debt restructuring process remains at an early stage.
Actors in the world of sovereign debt take a dim view of the Belgian
l4
injunction. They dismiss it as the maneuvering of a rogue creditor before a
rogue court. 15 It was, they charge, less action at law than piracy.16 The Belgian
court, moreover, got it wrong: Sovereign debt contracts do not contemplate
these enforcement actions. Compositions make the majority of cooperative
bondholders better off because they help to cure distress. Accordingly,
bondholders would be "crazy" to assent to debt contracts that held out
Paribas S.A., No. 03602569 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. \3, 2003). But cf Nacional Financiera, S.N.C. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 2003 WL 1878415 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003) (holding that pari passu clause covering
Mexican corporate borrower might support an injunction against its paying third party creditors but did not
support an intercreditor action).
II Between 1992 and 1997, credit flowed copiously into emerging markets, averaging $154 billion each
year. William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57
VAND. L. REv. (fortbcoming 2004).
12 This happened after financial crises in East Asia and Russia in 1997 and 1998. Lenders may have
underestimated the likelihood of liquidity crises and other economic distress. Alternatively, they may have
assumed that troubled sovereigns would be bailed out by the IMF. See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules,
Discretion. and Authority in International Financial Reform, 4 J. INT'L EcON. L. 6\3 (2001).
I3 Argentina has offered what it says is twenty-five cents on the dollar and what its creditors say is ten
cents on the dollar (discounted to present value). The creditors, who face a coordination problem of
unprecedented dimensions, are slowly getting themselves organized. An umbrella Global Committee of
Argentine Bondholders was established on January 12, 2004. It represents about half of the private sector
debt. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Americas: Argentina Plays 'Chicken' With the IMF, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
2004, at A13.
14 See Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel. Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy
Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 782 (2004).
15 Anna Gelpem, Building a Better Seating Chan for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1119,
1127 (2004) (noting that the lenders' organization has gone on record saying that rogue courts are a bigger
danger than rogue creditors).
16 Gulati & Klee, supra note 8, at 639.
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encouragements to opportunistic holdouts like Elliott. 17 Meanwhile, pari passu
clauses admit of a plausible narrow interpretation that does not extend the right
18
of payment asserted by the vultures.
The contract interpretation issue soon may be joined in the Southern
District of New York, where a class of Argentine bondholders has been
19
certified in an enforcement action. Argentina, fearing aggressive use of pari
passu clauses by these plaintiffs, already has moved (without success) for an
order precluding the plaintiffs from interfering with Argentina's payments to
other creditors. The U.S. government has filed a Statement of Interest in
20
support of Argentina's motion.
The government intervenes in aid of its policy pOSItion respecting the
sovereign debt crisis. Many actors in the world of international finance,
including the International Monetary Fund (lMF) , would like to see a
sovereign bankruptcy regime instituted for the purpose of ameliorating
21
frictions retarding restructuring negotiations. The U.S. Treasury opposes the
bankruptcy initiative, even as it agrees that the frictions need amelioration. In
the Treasury's view, the frictions stem from the terms of sovereign bond
contracts and so should be eliminated by rewriting the contracts rather than by
22
imposing an international law mandate. The Treasury's preference for the
narrow reading of the pari passu clause follows from the position that a broad
reading would add to the frictions.
There is a gap in this discussion. No one interrogates the possibility that
the broad reading of the pari passu clause invoked in Belgium holds out
benefits for sovereign bondholders as a group (and not just for a handful of
vulture investors). This Article addresses the gap, situating the clause in the
economic context of sovereign debt relationships. The Article shows that bond
contracts benefit bondholders in three ways when they create frictions that
17
18
19

[d.
See infra text accompanying notes 3542.
H.W. Urban GMBH v. Republic of Argentina, 2003 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 23363 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30,

2003).
20 Statement of Interest of the United States, Macrotecnic Int'! Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, 2004 U.S.
Dis!. LEXIS 2130 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,2004).
21 Anne Krueger, New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking,
Speech at the Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards Conference (Apr. I, 2002), available at http://
www.irnf.org!extemal/np/speeches/2002l040102.htm.
22 Under Secretary of Treasury John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective,
Speech at the Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards Conference (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://
www.iie.com/publications/papers/taylor0402.htm.
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retard sovereign debt compositions. First, the contracts diminish the likelihood
of default by opportunistic sovereigns seeking to externalize the effects of
economic reverses. Second, assuming severe financial distress, they make it
less likely that the defaulting sovereign will attempt to impose the burden of
restructuring on the particular class of bonds. Third, assuming a restructuring,
they improve the bondholders' bargaining position. More generally, the pari
passu clause, read broadly, constrains the distressed sovereign's range of
choices, enhancing the enforcement power of the bonds and arguably lowering
the long-run cost of sovereign debt capital.
This explanation justifies judicial attachment of the broad reading without,
at the same time, dictating its attachment or rendering the narrow reading
implausible or illegitimate. Accordingly, the explanation does not by virtue of
its own existence determine the issue of contract interpretation. It instead
highlights the difficulty of the case. No trade usage will emerge here to ease
the burden on the interpreting court, for actors in the sovereign debt market
dispute the clause's meaning in good faith. The court accordingly will bear
normative responsibility for the outcome. By way of providing contextual
guidance, this Article illuminates the source of the problem, depicting
sovereign debt as a world of trade offs and contradictions, where a contract
that makes the bondholders better off means one thing on the day it is executed
and delivered, and another thing in the event of severe distress later on. With
private debt, such contradictions are surmounted through the deus ex machina
of a bankruptcy regime. With sovereign debt there is no bankruptcy, forcing
the parties to paper over the tensions between ex ante and ex post by drafting
vaguely. Intractable questions of interpretation arise in consequence.
Part I describes the disruptive role the pari passu clause plays in sovereign
debt compositions, stating the case favoring the narrow reading. Part II
reconsiders the economic incentives in play at the time lenders close loans to
sovereigns, stating a case for the broad reading. Part III works the competing
readings through the legal framework of bond contract interpretation. The
exercise shows that the matter comes down to a choice between an ex ante
reading, conducted as of the time the contract is executed and delivered, and an
ex post reading, conducted as of the later time of distress. The Article
concludes that the ex post reading legitimately may be attached to the clause,
not because it is correct at all times and in all contexts, but because this is in
fact a time of distress.
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UNANIMOUS ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, HOLDING OUT, PRIORITY,
AND PAYMENT

This Part describes coordination problems and holdout incentives that
retard the process of sovereign debt restructuring. Because the broad reading
of the pari passu clause aggravates these problems, to describe the
restructuring process is to state a policy justification for a narrow reading. A
practice-based case for a narrow reading supplements the policy argument.
A. The Policy Case for a Narrow Interpretation

With private debt, defaults lead to enforcement against debtor property.
Left unchecked, a sequence of uncoordinated judgments, levies, executions,
and property sales literally tears apart a distressed producing entity. Corporate
bankruptcy reorganization prevents this, staying creditor enforcement actions
and providing a safe space for a composition bargain that scales down the
creditors' payment rights and returns the debtor to fiscal health.
Sovereign debt works differently. Sovereign immunity limits opportunities
for direct enforcement. Default accordingly leads to informal, often lengthy
standstills instead of destructive "grab races." The creditors wait out the
period of distress, expecting eventual economic recovery to lead to a
resumption of payments. Payment resumption often requires that the creditors
come to the negotiating table to rewrite the defaulted debt contracts. Such a
"composition," or "restructuring," scales down the sovereign's obligations.
In theory, this causes the sovereign to recover from financial distress more
quickly and should make both the sovereign and its creditors better off.
Process barriers must be overcome in the conclusion of a composition.
Some stem from information asymmetries, others from coordination problems
due to large numbers of creditors. Still others stem from the bond contracts
themselves. Boilerplate clauses, called "unanimous action clauses" (UACs),
can condition amendment of the bond contract's key payment terms on
unanimous bondholder consent. Historically, UACs govern sovereign bonds
issued in New York. Sovereign bond contracts executed and delivered in
London, in contrast, contain "collective action clauses" (CACs), which permit
across-the-board amendments with a three-quarters majority. Where as CACs
facilitate restructuring of the defaulting sovereign's debt, UACs stand in the
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way. Corporate debt also tends to contain UACs, but bankruptcy regimes
23
trump the clauses with mandatory collective action.
The feasibility of unanimous creditor consent to a composition depends on
the numbers and the lending context. Historically, groups of bank creditors,
even large ones, have proved amenable to, if not eager for, such consent. The
numbers are small and norms of cooperation are brought to bear against the
unruly.24 With thickly-traded, bonded debt and thousands of bondholders
dispersed around the globe, unanimous action is impossible. At least one
bondholder always will say no. An incentive to hold out arises from the very
fact that the composition makes the bondholders better off as a group. The
opportunistic bondholder withholds its essential vote in hopes of procuring a
side payment from the transaction's proponents.
UACs do not present an absolute bar to the restructuring of widely
dispersed debt, however. A composition can be effected by indirection.
Instead of being asked to vote to amend their bond contracts, the bondholders
are asked to exchange their bonds for substitute bonds that contain modified
terms more favorable to the debtor. The proponent neither expects nor
requests universal participation. Even so, the closing of the exchange offer
will be conditioned on supermajority acceptance. Holdouts remain a problem
because a freeriding strategy remains available to a bondholder opportunist.
Even if no side payment will be forthcoming, saying no to an exchange offer
means holding on to the original, unamended bond. Such a hold out retains the
benefit of the debtor's original promise to pay and all other contract rights,
even as the exchanging majority makes concessions in respect of the timing
and amount of payments. If only a few creditors hold out, the exchange offer
still succeeds. But if enough creditors succumb to temptation and join the
holdouts, the exchange offer fails. More particularly, if the subsidy to the
holdouts is greater than the increase in value to the exchanging creditors, every
25
one is better off refusing to exchange.
The failure of the offer makes
everybody worse off.
Bond issuers wield a weapon against holdouts in the form of an "exit
consent" attached to the exchange offer. Under the New York drafting
practice, the contract's payment terms are subject to UACs, while ancillary

Bratton & Gulati, supra note I 1.
Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on InterCreditor Relationships, 1988 V.ILL. L. REV. 493, 507-10.
25 Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts. 97 YALE L.J. 232. 236 (1987).
23

24
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protective promises and process terms are subject to CACs. An exit consent is
a proposal to remove these protective provisions by a majority vote
amendment under the CAC made simultaneously with an exchange offer. The
cooperative, exchanging bondholders approve the amendment even as they
exit. This leaves the holdouts with their original principal and interest terms
intact but subject to manipulative action by the debtor. For example, a
sovereign bond's negative pledge clause, which protects against the creation of
security interests in other issues of debt, can be removed by means of exit
consents. As drafted historically, sovereign debt contracts also leave their pari
26
passu clauses vulnerable to removal by exit consent. As protective provisions
disappear, the likelihood that the holdouts ever receive their unamended
27
principal and interest payments diminishes.
Indeed, starvation by continued nonpayment is the sovereign debtor's tactic
of last resort against holdouts-at least as long as the pari passu clause is read
narrowly. Sovereign compositions work very differently from their corporate
counterparts at this point in the scenario. Corporate restructuring outside of
bankruptcy occurs on a preemptive basis, prior to default. The holdout takes a
free ride if the exchange offer succeeds: It is "buoyed up," retaining a bond
paying one hundred cents on the dollar even as it joins the creditors who
exchanged for scaled-down payments in benefiting from the avoidance of
bankruptcy and the debtor's rehabilitation. If the corporate debtor wishes to
stay out of bankruptcy after the composition closes, it will have to stay current
on payments to the holdout as well as to all other creditors. In the sovereign
context the stakes ratchet up on both sides. Many sovereign restructurings
occur after a payment default. Because composition means the exchange of
old paper for new, it does not cure the default on the old paper. As with Elliott
and its Peruvian debt, the holdout retains the power to both accelerate its own
debt and claim the entire principal amount to be due presently. The holdout

26 The standard UAC language broadly covers the bondholders' right to payment, and accordingly could
be read to cover the pari passu clause. See, e.g., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus, Government of
Jamaica, 10.625% Notes Due 2017, at 62-63 (June 4, 2002). Here the contract contains a UAC including
amendments that would "reduce any amounts payable" or change the "obligation to pay any additional
amounts." Arguably, phrases like these refer to money due and owing under the note, rights that would not be
affected by lifting of the pari passu clause. But the matter is not free from doubt. Drafters of exchange offers
avoid the issue by having the exit consent modify the bond contract's sovereign immunity waiver so as to
exclude attachment of amounts paid under the composition. See Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus,
Republica Oriental del Uruguay, Offer to Exchange, at S-4 (Apr. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Uruguay Exchange
Offer], available at http://www.bcu.gub.uy/autoriza/sgoioilreperfilamiento/prospectosup.pdf.
27 On the use of exit consents to engineer a sovereign restructuring, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu
Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59 (2000).
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thus is buoyed up much higher with respect to the restructured debt than is the
28
holdout in the corporate case.
But the sovereign debtor has an option
unavailable to the corporate debtor: It can get away with leaving the holdout to
starve as long as two conditions obtain. First, the holdout must have no viable
route to enforcement of its claims, a route held out by the broad reading of the
pari passu clause attached in Belgium. Second, the existence of unpaid
holdout debt must not destabilize the rehabilitated sovereign's relations with
29
the credit markets.
If pari passu clauses support actions by holders of defaulted sovereign
bonds to block payments to other sovereign creditors, then sovereign holdouts
3D
occupy much the same bargaining position as their corporate counterparts. If
pari passu clauses do not prohibit payments to favored creditors by sovereigns
in default, the potential holdout's calculations are materially altered. As long
as the value on offer in the composition is greater than the market value of the'
bond, even a vulture fund might find participation advantageous. Such a
vulture, much like Elliott with its Peruvian bank debt, will have purchased its
bonds at a deep discount in the secondary market after the onset of distress and

28 The standard corporate trust indenture inhibits the holdout in an additional respect. Individual holders
may bring unilateral enforcement actions only in respect of missed payments of principal and interest; they
may not unilaterally accelerate their own bonds. See REVISED MODEL SIMPLIFIED INDENTURE §§ 6.02, 6.07
(2000), reprinted in 55 Bus. LAW. 1115 (2000). For the suggestion that sovereign bonds should be redrafted
to follow the corporate pattern and remove the unilateral acceleration right, see Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M.
Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY LJ.
1047, 1076-77 (2004).
29 This point follows from the reputation theory of sovereign debt. See infra text accompanying note 44.
It does not follow that restructuring contracts can forbid the sovereign from making payments to holdouts.
Such a term might open the benefited holders to an action for inducement of breach of contract. See Keith
Clark, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Parity of Treatment Between Equivalent Creditors in Relation to
Comparable Debts, 20 [NT'L LAW. 857, 863 (1986); cf. First Wyo. Bank, Casper v. Mudge, 748 F.2d 713 (10th
Cir. 1988) (holding a bank knowingly taking security in violation of a negative pledge liable for tortious
interference). Due to this fear of tort liability, contracts in bank restructurings only go so far as to provide that
if the debtor pays nonparticipating debt ahead of schedule, it will pay the rescheduled debt pro rata. See Philip
R. Wood, Pari Passu Clauses-What Do They Mean?, 18 BUTfERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 371,
373 (2003).
Note that the pari passu clause, under the broad reading, induces no defaults; it instead prevents
selective compliance with other obligations assuming default on the debt the clause covers. A clause drafted
in the negative-in which the borrower covenanted not to make any payments to other creditors-would be
more problematic. See Clark, supra, at 863.
3D This is assuming, of course, that the holdout can find no other assets of the sovereign against which to
levy execution.
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will be looking for spectacular short-term returns. Without an easy route to
payment in full, the composition itself becomes the source of the quick profit.
The outcome of the interpretation of the pari passu clause has parallel
implications for the debate over a sovereign bankruptcy regime. The IMF's
proposed bankruptcy architecture would trump UACs and facilitate
restructuring in a majority action framework. The U.S. Treasury agrees on the
need for majority action even as it rejects bankruptcy, due to a preference for
32
market solutions over regulatory intervention. Because UACs lie at the core
of the process problem and UACs are contract terms, the Treasury is
encouraging the parties to sovereign bond contracts to rewrite the terms instead
of supporting an international mandate overriding the terms. In the Treasury's
view, CACs are superior to UACs from an efficiency point of view, with
UACs benefiting only opportunists who hold up rational creditors attempting
to enhance value. It follows, says the Treasury,33 that sovereign bondholders
will freely exchange their existing UAC bonds for CAC bonds, ameliorating
the coordination problems. All one need do is make a public offer of the new
CAC bonds and let the market price them. The price will at all events exceed
that of the UAC bonds, inducing across-the-board exchanges by the tens of
34
billions of face amount.
The Treasury's intervention has not triggered across-the-board exchange
offers eliminating UACs from the existing sovereign debt stock, even as
notable progress has been made in the inclusion of CACs in new financings in
New York.
Meanwhile, the Treasury's opposition stalled the IMF's
35
bankruptcy initiative. The holdout problem remains on the table as a result.
A policy signal for the interpreting judge results: Because the broad reading of
pari passu magnifies incentives to hold out where the narrow reading
diminishes them, the narrow reading should attach. Significantly, the policy
considerations that point to the narrow interpretation also motivate both the
IMF bankruptcy initiative and the Treasury's visionary exchange offer.

31 John C. Coffee. Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in
Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1207, 1214 (1991).
32 See Barry Eichengreen, Financial Crises and What to Do About Them, ch. I (200 I) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author); Taylor, supra note 22.
33 See Taylor, supra note 22.
34 Adam Lerrick & Allan H. Meltzer, Sovereign Default: The Private Sector Can Resolve Bankruptcy
Without a Formal Coun (Carnegie Mellon, Gaillot Center for Public Policy, Quarterly Int'l Econ. Report, Apr.
2002), available at http://emcreditors.comlpdf/n_JEC%20S0V%20Bankruptcy%20Study .pdf.
35 Bratton & Gulati, supra note II.

HeinOnline -- 53 Emory L.J. 832 2004

2004]

PARI PASSU AND A DISTRESSED SOVEREIGN'S RATIONAL CHOICES

833

Proponents of the broad reading are left looking like greedy speculators,
scheming and wheedling beyond the pale of legitimate justificatory policy.
B. The Practice Case for a Narrow Interpretation
When a borrower is unable to pay all of its debts as they come due, at least
one of its creditors (and likely more than one if it has many creditors) will
receive less than the borrower's promised performance. The broad reading of
the pari passu clause is addressed to this situation, according protection when
one or more, but not necessarily all, creditors will be receiving less than is due
and owing. Under the broad reading, the borrower in default undertakes to pay
its foreign obligations pro rata to the extent it makes payments at all when in
default. The pari passu clause, thus read, means pro rata payment to all so that
no creditor receives a de facto preference or priority.36
The narrow reading, in contrast, is less purposive and more textual. Return
now to the pari passu clause in Peru's defaulted guaranty, which stated that
"[t]he obligations of the Guarantor hereunder do rank and will rank at least
pari passu in priority of payment with all other External Indebtedness of the
Guarantor, and interest thereon. ,,37 Note that the clause never quite says "the
Guarantor shall pay." Instead it makes a representation and a promise about
"priority of payment." Much hangs on the distinction. The narrow reading's
proponents assert that the clause intelligibly can be read to cover
"priorities"-rights to payment as against other creditors in contract and in
law-as opposed to the payments themselves.
The case for the narrow reading follows from history. The proponents start
their historical story a century and a half ago and layout a succession of
narrow functions served by the clause in different transactional contexts. No
additional content, they assert, should be added.
The story has four phases. It starts with Victorian railroad bonds. The
default rule under British law in those days created priorities in collateral under
a common mortgage in accordance with the time of debt issue or the time of
debt maturity.38 This first-in-time regime did not suit the purposes of bond
issuers and holders under open-ended mortgages, who wanted all holders of all

Wood, supra note 29, at 372.
Lowenfeld Declaration, supra note I, '119.
Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY
L.J. 869, 895 (2004).
36

37
38
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bonds benefited by the lien to have equal rights. Accordingly, the mortgages
provided that a foreclosing creditor acted for the benefit of all holders at the
••
•
39
same pnonty, pan passu.
In the story's second phase, the pari passu clause shows up in sovereign
bonds in the early twentieth century. Sovereign borrowers in those days often
"earmarked" certain assets or cash flows, attaching the payment streams to
stated debt issues without formally conceding liens. These quasi-security
interests implied de facto priorities in the subject assets. The practical value of
the de facto commitments was questionable, of course. Even so, other lenders
objected to the practice. Pari passu clauses appeared in unsecured sovereign
debt contracts to forbid earmarking, performing the same function served by
negative pledge clauses in issues today.40
In the story's third phase, we move forward in time to cross-border bank
lending to corporations in the post-war era. Pari passu clauses are included in
these contracts to ameliorate legal risks held out by national insolvency
regimes. In cross-border lending, nothing guarantees that the borrower's
national bankruptcy law operates, like that of the United States and the United
41
Kingdom, to condition a claim's subordination on the claimant's consent.
The pari passu clause is thought to trump unconsented subordination by
42
operation of nationallaw.
Now to the final phase of the story, in which the pari passu clause appears
in contemporary sovereign bank loan and bond documentation, once again in
Id. at 895-96.
Id. at 896-97, 912-13; see also 2 PHILIP WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
§ 6.03[3J (1980); William Tudor John, Sovereign Risk and Immunity Under English Law and Practice. in I
39

40

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 7 1,95-96 (Robert S. Rendell ed., 2d ed. 1983).
41 It follows on this reading that U.S. domestic corporate debt requires no pari passu clause because the
system does not allow for involuntary subordination. Buchheit & Pam. supra note 38, at 873-74. This is right
so far as it goes. To go a step farther. shift to the broad reading and ask why domestic corporate bonds do not
require pari passu payments. The answer is that prior to default, payments are assumed to be unequal because
different debt issues have different payment schedules. After default, one of two things happens. If the debtor
goes into bankruptcy, the bankruptcy system loosely imposes equality and recaptures a limited class of
preferential payments. See J I U.S.c. § 1129(b)(I) (2000) (containing a prohibition of discrimination in
bankruptcy reorganization plans). If the debtor does not go into bankruptcy proceedings, a regime of creditor
diligence prevails, and the creditors race to the courthouse under a regime of first-in-time priority. Because the
bankruptcy alternative can be resorted to by a creditor concerned that the enforcement actions of others will
lead to an unequal result, see id. § 303 (providing for involuntary bankruptcy petitions filed by creditors), no
contractual pari passu provision is necessary. The system does tolerate preferential payments by debtors in
distress prior to bankruptcy, subject to Bankruptcy Code § 547. See id. § 547; Debra J. Schnebel, Intercreditor
and Subordination Agreements-A Practical Guide, 118 BANKING LJ. 48, 49 (2001).
42 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 872; see also Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 24, at 497.
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order to block involuntary subordination. The need for the block intensifies,
given a sovereign borrower. Hypothesize a national government wishing to
repudiate a predecessor government's debt obligations. It orchestrates a
legislative intervention under which the inconvenient debt is subordinated by
law to all of its other obligations. The government then claims that positive
law prevents payment, tying its hands. The pari passu clause supposedly
assures that a positive law payment restraint, whatever its etiology, is not a
43
defense to an action on the contract. For a more mundane example of a
subordination risk under national law, consider a procedure held out by the
laws of Spain, the Philippines, and other Spanish-speaking countries. A
creditor and a debtor can join together formally to register their debt contract,
paying a fee. The reward is a juridical priority over other unsecured creditors.
In the pari passu clause, the sovereign debtor promises not to participate in this
ritual. It also warrants against the presence of a legal priority ladder applying
to unsecured debt.44
This four-part story neatly explains the narrow reading of pari passu. We
see, say the proponents, why the clause is so opaque: The vague drafting
follows from the fact that over time the clause has come to cover multiple
45
problems.
C. Summary

The historical story leaves open some questions: Even if all of the
foregoing is true, what prevents the opaquely drafted clause from covering
preferential payments as well? Does the narrow reading of necessity limit the
clause's reach to the concerns identified-priority in law and the lapsed
practice of earmarking of revenues-so as to require exclusion of preferential
payments? Nothing in the historical account implies such a limit. The limit
comes from the contemporary policy context in which the broad reading
strengthens the hands of holdouts and discourages compositions.
The narrow reading thus commends itself not because of the history but
because the sovereign debt markets have stumbled into crisis. Given the crisis,
if all other things are equal, the narrow reading should be preferred because it
43 The ploy is not a defense to enforcement actions in the United States. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco
Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola
de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934
(1985). For further discussion, see Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 913-14.
44 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 903-05; Wood, supra note 29, at 371-72.
45 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 912.
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makes restructuring easier to accomplish by making holding out less attractive.
The question is whether all other things are in fact equal. Part II shows that
they are not. It states a case for "priority of payment" to cover payments as
well as contractual or positive law priorities even in the context of sovereign
distress. The choice between the two readings entails a tradeoff between two
rational but inconsistent approaches to the problem presented by distress.
II. PARI PASSU AND SOVEREIGN CHOICES: DEFAULT AND PRIORITY

Distressed debtors tend to be conceived as actors without choices. In this
picture, defaults occur because resources are exhausted, not because the
debtors act strategically; if resources are exhausted no creditor gets paid. The
reality is more complicated. Sometimes debtors have a choice as to whether to
default. Once in default, debtors may have resources available to pay some but
not all of their creditors, making it possible to choose favorites. The pari
passu clause, under the broad reading, addresses these choices toward the end
of reducing the sovereign borrower's zone of discretion. By making
compositions harder to conclude, the clause makes default a less attractive
choice and hence less likely to occur. By making preferential payments
vulnerable to challenge, the clause makes it less likely that the bonds it protects
will bear a disproportionate share of the costs of distress.
Section A discusses the pari passu clause's bearing on debtor incentives to
default, applying microeconomic explanations of sovereign debt. Section B
discusses the clause's bearing on the defaulting sovereign's choices concerning
restructuring and priority.
A. The Choice to Default

The economics of sovereign debt build on the following axiom: Unless
default imposes some cost on the debtor, not only will the debtor not pay the
46
debt, the lender will not make the loan in the first place. Sovereign lending
presupposes that default has a cost. The lower that cost, the smaller the
sovereign's borrowing capacity; the greater the cost, the more willing the
lenders are.

46 Gabrielle Lipworth & lens Nystedt. Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adaptation. 47 IMF STAFF
188. 192. 195 (2001). available at http://www.imf.orglExternallpubslFTlstaffp/2000100-00/ln.pdf.

PAPERS
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The threshold problem for the economics of sovereign debt is to identify
the cost that satisfies the axiom. The problem admits of no easy solution
because sovereign creditors lack conventional means of enforcement by levy
and execution against debtor property. The exercise of working through the
debate isolates aspects of sovereign debt relationships that make credible the
broad reading of the pari passu clause.
1. Reputation in the Credit Markets
Under one school of thought, the cost of sovereign default lies in exclusion
from future borrowing. The leading model assumes that national economies
are cyclical and that people prefer to consume evenly across the cycles. Given
this, it makes sense for the state to borrow on the downward cycle to fund
consumption and later to repay the loans with returns generated on the upward
cycle. The defaulting sovereign converts to itself a gain from trade-the
extemporal consumption trade across the business cycle. In the model, the
default triggers a lender embargo. The debtor ends the embargo by
transferring the converted surplus to the lenders, its rightful owners.47 The cost
of default to the sovereign is the cost of being shut out of the credit markets on
the upward cycle and associated consumption constraints on the next
48
downward cycle. Access to the credit markets being the key, this is termed
the "reputational" model of sovereign debt.
On first inspection, this description supports the narrow reading of the pari
passu claus«. If a high-powered interest in credit market access determines the
sovereign's behavior, then the sovereign will only default in the event of an
unanticipated shortage of resources due to an external shock or other

47 As long as the transfer is made, the credit moratorium can be a short one. See Kenneth M. KIetzer &
Brian D. Wright, Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter, 90 AM. EcON. REv. 621 (2000). The credit inflows
to Latin America in the early 1990s in the wake of Brady restructurings provide a good example of this. See
Charles W. Calomiris, How to Resolve the Argentine Sovereign Debt Crisis (AEI Papers & Studies, Apr. 16,
200 1), available at http://www.aei.org/incIudelpub_print.asp?publD= 14869.
48 In this picture, the only state that repudiates its debt is the state that never plans to borrow again.
Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 47, at 189-90. More elaborate articulations of this reputational model open up
the class of defaults to distinguish between strategic and distress situations and expand the lenders' behavior
pattern to allow for the possibility of forgiveness. See Harold L. Cole et aI., Default, Settlement, and
Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 INT'L EcON. REV. 365 (1995)
(developing a model of how defaulting sovereigns lose access to credit markets and work to regain access); see
also Michael R. Tomz, Sovereign Debt and International Cooperation: Reputational Reasons for Lending and
Repayment (Oct. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing how sovereign lenders who
default can re-enter the lending markets by incurring the high-cost signal of repaying their earlier debts and
showing themselves no longer to be "lemons").
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misfortune. The liquidity crises suffered by several emerging market debtors
in the 1990s provide a good example of such severe distress: Nonresidents
suddenly pull out their capital and resident capital responds by fleeing to other
jurisdictions; liquidity quickly disappears and the economy is literally unable
49
to meet external obligations. Sovereigns defaulting in such situations have no
choice in the matter. It follows that contract terms play no role in discouraging
these defaults. At the same time, once the liquidity crisis eases, the defaulting
sovereign has every incentive to present a plan of composition that returns it to
the good graces of the credit markets. This is the point in the description when
contract terms become pertinent: If a term creates a friction that retards the
negotiation process, it arguably fails cost-benefit inspection. Doubts arise with
respect to both UACs and the broad reading of the pari passu clause.
The picture changes if we modify the assumption concerning the intensity
of the sovereign's desire to maintain its reputation in the credit markets. In this
modified picture, the sovereign remains concerned about its reputation but can
be influenced by competing concerns. Hypothesize that the sovereign's
economy lapses into distress slowly. At some point the question arises as to
whether the economy can sustain the debt load out of its own resources. A
good faith decision as to medium- or long-term unsustainability can be made,
even though the sovereign's foreign exchange reserves remain sufficient to
50
meet near-term payments. In this scenario, default comes to make sense as an
act of political will: Actors in the national government (along with their
domestic political opponents) decide that the tax burden and administrative
costs of continued debt service are intolerable and that the burden of payment
51
(political as well as economic) outweighs the costs of default.
If we relax the intensity of the sovereign's desire to maintain its reputation
52

one step more, a strategic default becomes possible. This is an opportunistic
breach stemming from the debtor's desire to siphon off the payment flow on
the loan for another purpose. Because debt payments reduce current income,

49 Punan Chuham & Federico Sturzenegger, Default Episodes in the I990s: What Have We Learned? 5
(July 25, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.utdt.eduldepartamentos/empresarial/cif/
pdfs-wp/wpcif-112003.pdf.
50 Id.
51 Jonathan Eaton, Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Comracts, J. EeON. PERSP.,
Winter 1990, at 43, 48-49. For example, only one of the nations in default in the Latin American debt crisis of
the I 980s, Chile, owed as much as one year's gross national product. See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A
Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, 97 J. POL. EeON. 155, 156 (1989).
52 Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 47, at 195.
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default is welfare-improving as long as consequences in the credit markets
carry little weight in the cost-benefit analysis.
In both of these scenarios-a good-faith distress default resulting from
political and economic calculation and a strategic default-the sovereign
makes choices. It follows that the debt contracts can playa role in influencing
the sovereign's choices, at least as long as the sovereign retains an interest in a
future return to the credit markets. Pari passu clauses (under the broad
reading), along with UACs, make the composition process more costly, adding
to the costs of default. In so doing, they delay distress defaults and discourage
53
strategic defaults.
Because they make default less likely, they benefit the
sovereign by increasing its debt capacity. In addition, the sovereign that
commits to high restructuring costs at the negotiating table signals its status as
54
a good credit, lowering the cost of borrowing.
An efficiency question arises at this point in the analysis. Costs of default
could be too high (greater debtor welfare loss than needed for the given
measure of creditor protection) or too low (default cost insufficient to import
an incentive to perform). Professors Bolton and Skeel here intervene to argue
that sovereigns have perverse incentives to commit to excessively costly
defaults. Information asymmetry supplies one explanation for this-the
sovereign that commits to high restructuring costs signals its confidence in its
ability to pay. Another reason is political-a given government may borrow
heavily to satisfy short term objectives. Contract forms that make default
expensive expand the government's borrowing capacity and so suit the
purposes of these short-sighted political actors. The actors, however,
underweigh the long-run costs of the contract terms because the costs are
incurred after their terms of office.
The pari passu clause mayor may not be economically efficient under the
55
broad reading. Bolton and Skeel's analysis suggests that it is not. But the
53

Contrariwise, if a decrease in the cost of default is welfare maximizing, default is too expensive. [d. at

199.
54 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 14, at 771. Bolton and Skeel argue that the incentive problem would be
corrected by a regime of first-in-time priority. Under this, the sovereign's borrowing room would shrink as the
amount of debt increased. The cost of each successive borrowing would rise, discouraging more debt. In the
present pari passu regime, in contrast, each borrowing ranks equally, encouraging overborrowing. The cost of
capital is higher than it would be under the first-in-time regime because the first lender raises its rate in
anticipation of later claim dilution. [d. at 788-90.
55 Cf Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, 104
J. POL. ECON. I (1996). Working with a stylized deScription of the private borrower. Bolton and Scharfstein
hypothesize that a low-quality firm would find it optimal to maximize its liquidation value. A distress default

HeinOnline -- 53 Emory L.J. 839 2004

840

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

analysis simultaneously suggests that the parties to sovereign bond contracts
have every reason to subscribe to the broad reading as a purposive matter. An
inefficient term may nevertheless be the term intended and the inefficient
meaning may be the meaning understood in the market.
2. The Defecting Lender

Return now to the reputational model of sovereign debt as originally
described above and assume a sovereign with such an overwhelming incentive
to maintain its reputation that it will default only involuntarily. In this
scenario, contract terms that make default more costly impose a deadweight
cost. But a distinction opens up at this point between a UAC and a pari passu
clause under the broad reading, with the UAC imposing a deadweight cost and
the pari passu clause holding out a benefit to the creditors even as it adds a
friction. If the sovereign debtor has a high-powered incentive to regain access
to the credit market, then the lender's primary problem lies less with the
default itself than with the possibility of opportunistic behavior on the part of
other lenders in the wake of default. A lender with no exposure to the
defaulted debt could break ranks with the unpaid creditors, ignore their
moratorium, and make a new loan to the defaulting sovereign. This new
source of credit diminishes the sovereign's incentive to reach a composition
with its unpaid lenders. The new lender's very appearance satisfies the
sovereign's reputational objective. As long as such a lender is in the picture,
even a highly motivated sovereign might find strategic default a viable option.
Kensington International Ltd. v. Republic of Cong056 provides a real world
example of this incentive problem. Congo incurred the debt in question in
1984, but made no payments after 1985. Congo continued to tap credit
markets in the industrial world through a wholly owned alter ego called
Societe Nationale des Petrole du Congo (SNPC). SNPC procured and secured
funds for Congo's petroleum operations in blatant violation of the negative
57
pledge clause in the 1984 debt contract. So low is the stock of loyalty among
lending institutions that blue-chip banks in France and Canada happily did
being likely, it would want contracts carrying as little cost as possible in the event of default. The smaller the
number of creditors and the lower the voting barrier, the cheaper the liquidation and the greater the value of
the debt. /d. at 3. A high quality firm, in contrast, presents little risk of a distress default. Here, Bolton and
Scharfstein see strategic default as the dominant problem. Factors increasing the cost of such a default-such
as mUltiple creditors and tougher voting rules-enhance the value of the debt. [d.
56 2002 No. 1088 (Commercial Ct. Apr. 16,2003), aff'd, 2003 WL 1935493 (C.A. May 13,2003). The
vulture plaintiff in this case did not manage to procure an injunction.
57 [d. at 15-26.
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business with SNPC, even as its alter ego remained in default on earlier
obligations.
In the economic models, the reputational mechanism returns to working
order if the original lenders persuade the sovereign borrower to cheat the
interloping lender. 58 With the interloper thrown into the composition process
with the other unpaid lenders, the threat of refusal to lend once more becomes
a cost to the borrower. In the real world, a pari passu clause, broadly
interpreted, could provide the unpaid creditors a more effective assist. The
defaulting sovereign can subvert the reputational system only by servicing its
new borrowings while simultaneously remaining in default on its old
borrowings. The broad reading prohibits this ploy, forcing the sovereign to
make pro rata payments to both old and new lenders. For the lenders, the
problem less concerns the meaning of the clause than, as usually is the case
with sovereign debt, with finding a way to get the clause enforced. Elliott
59
Associates' action in Belgium did just that.
3. Indirect Enforcement

A second economic model of sovereign debt is built around the possibility
of sanctions. This theory asserts that a sovereign might rationally repudiate its
debts even when it needs a future source of finance to smooth consumption in
downward cycles. The model depicts a sovereign at the end of an upward
cycle. It possesses a cache of capital with which to pay the debt incurred on
the previous downward cycle. In the model, the solvent sovereign has a
choice. It can either pay the debt or it can default and invest the capital in an
insurance contract designed to protect it against the next downturn. When this
investment opportunity is available, the rational sovereign defaults because in
the long run saving and investment have a higher return than borrowing and
repaying. When saving and investment of the purloined capital accompany the
default, the sovereign grows faster, increasing its consumption with every tum
60
of the cycle. It follows that the sovereign's incentive to please the credit
markets is unreliable and sovereign debt cannot be sustained on a basis of

58 K1etzer & Wright, supra note 47, at 622.
59 See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
60 William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the
1840's, 86 AM. EeON. REv. 259, 267 (\996). If the debtor has no place in which to invest, the reputational
concern causes it to honor the debt. See Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, The Role of Institutions in
Reputation Models of Sovereign Debt, 35 J. MONETARY EeON. 45, 47 (1995).
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reputational enforcement. The lender must have some additional recourse with
61
which to inflict a financial cost on the defaulter.
A question arises at this point as to the viability of the lenders' real world
enforcement arsenal. Sovereigns in default tend not to leave obvious assets in
plain view abroad for creditor attachment. Diplomatic and military assets are
exempt. Central bank assets tend to have stronger immunities in the United
62
States and the United Kingdom than other sovereign assets.
State-owned
airlines are cited as an exception to the rule, and some Russian creditors
63
managed to bring credible enforcement actions in the late 1990s. But as a
general matter, the markets do not rely on direct enforcement.
The
enforcement theory of sovereign debt accordingly emphasizes indirect costs
the defaulting sovereign incurs in evading its creditors. Its foreign trade must
be conducted in roundabout ways; it loses access to short-term trade credits
like bankers' acceptances; and when it places an asset abroad a costly dummy
entity must be used. Proponents of the enforcement theory contend that even if
the costs of evasion are small in relation to GNP, the costs still will loom large
enough in comparison to the defaulted interest to make repudiation
inconvenient; if the costs of default do not exceed five percent of total trade,
64
they say, few countries show a net gain on debt repudiation.
The example of Congo raises doubts about the enforcement model. But
credibility follows when the direct costs of default to the sovereign's economy
are added to the indirect costs of evasion. Default tends to implicate a
currency and banking crisis that disrupts the sovereign's domestic financial
system and limits the availability of financial resources. Confidence declines,
and with it economic performance. In the 1990s, a currency crisis implied a

61 Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 51, at 157-58; see Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is
To Forgive To Forget?, 79 AM. EcON. REv. 43 (1989).
62 As these assets are immune from prejudgment attachment in the United States and United Kingdom,
the sovereign has time to shift them to a safe place before a creditor gets a chance to levy execution. Gelpem,
supra note 15, at 1121-22.
63 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 14, at 782.
64 Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 51, at 158-59, 167, 174-75. The model's opponents argue that recent
debt crises have yielded little evidence of lender interference with the trade of defaulters. Kletzer & Wright,
supra note 47, at 622. Moreover, it is not entirely clear why the lenders would want to interfere with the trade
of a defaulting debtor, at least given a distress default. Choking the debtor's trade only prolongs the distress
and further delays the payment stream. Historians have found evidence to support both theses. Compare
English, supra note 55 (arguing that defaults of American states during the 1840s support the reputational
model), with James Conklin, The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain Under Philip II, 106 J. POL. EcON. 483
(1998) (arguing that the history of the sixteenth-century relationship between the Genovese bankers and the
Spanish crown supports the enforcement model).
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two percent annual decline in output growth across a five-year period.
costs of crisis import a credible incentive to repay.66

65

843

These

The enforcement model delivers us to the same ambiguous endpoint
reached with the reputation model. Coordination problems stemming from
UACs and pari passu clauses still raise a concern about postdefault transaction
costs. If, as some assert, sovereigns as a practical matter only default under
67
identifiably bad conditions and strategic defaults are not a practical
possibility, it follows that the costs of default are sufficient to import incentives
to perform. Indeed, default might cost too much. But others assert that both
68
strategic default and distress default are active possibilities.
If strategic
defaults are possible, then the costs of default stemming from loss of
confidence, loss of credit, and trade disruption are arguably too low. In this
view, transaction costs stemming from UACs and pari passu clauses also are
costs of default and so may have a beneficial deterrent effect. Finally, note
that what is at bottom a default due to distress may nevertheless entail a
political choice among costly courses of action. As long as the sovereign has a
choice as to whether to default, strategy inheres in the fact pattern, and added
69
default costs may satisfy the cost-benefit test.
B. De Facto Priorities and the Terms of the Composition

Now assume that the sovereign has defaulted, whether involuntarily or as a
strategic decision. A new range of choices opens up. The sovereign first
decides which issues of debt will be restructured and which will not. Having
made that decision, the sovereign determines the terms of the composition
70
package. The pari passu clause, broadly read, can influence the sovereign'S
decision in the bondholders' favor at both stages.

Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 3.
/d. at 6. An analogy to indirect bankruptcy costs in the private sector is noted. See Edward I. Altman,
A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067 (1984) (estimating indirect
costs of bankruptcy).
67 Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck. Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable
Default, Repudiation, and Reputation, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 1088, 1088 (1988).
68 See, e.g.• Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 46, at 193.
69 The foregoing analysis implies a debt ceiling for each sovereign. The greater the borrowed amount,
the greater the benefit of default and the more likely default is signaled by the borrower's cost-benefit analysis.
The total debt load should not be permitted to approach that level. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt
with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 REv. ECON. STUD. 289, 289-90 (1981).
The debt ceiling will rise, however, as the creditors' enforcement devices make default more costly for the
debtor.
70 Ideally, a distressed sovereign restructures prior to default. When a debtor with a current payment
65

66
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1. Priority as Sovereign Choice

With corporate debt, priorities follow from explicit contract terms or are
imposed by legal regimes. A security interest or mortgage creates a priority
for its holder; both are enforced in bankruptcy. In addition, the bankruptcy
system accords priority in law to favored creditors, such as taxing authorities,
new lenders, and counsel.
Sovereign debt is different. Given barriers to enforcement, contracted-for
7
security interests and subordinations have dubious value. ! The priorities that
count are created as a matter of practice. A sovereign debtor in distress,
although lacking cash to service all of its obligations, very well may have cash
to service some of its obligations. Once in default, the debtor chooses which
creditors get paid and which do not. Obligations are excluded from
restructuring, and thereby effectively prioritized, if the sovereign deems the
72
exclusion convenient to its own financial interests. If the creditors selected
for nonpayment ever want to see any money, they will have to consent to
restructuring. The practice of selection implies a powerful case for the broad
reading of pari passu.
To see the case, consider first the pattern of de facto priority that prevailed
in the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s. Bank creditors were largest in
amount and made up the core group chosen for restructuring. Bondholders, in
73
contrast, tended to be exempted. Restructuring of dispersed bond issues was
widely thought not to be feasible, whether due to the existence of anonymous
74
bearer paper or the presence of uncooperative, litigious holders.
Even if
restructuring in fact was feasible-Costa Rica closed a bondholder exchange
75
offer in the late 1980s -it was thought not to be cost effective. The
record begins to experience liquidity problems, a composition can be tbe means to avert default. The objective
will be to delay near-term maturities, stretching out tbe payment schedule and reducing the near-term interest
burden. There will be a basis for trade witb the creditors if, due to tbe borrower's distressed condition, the
debt is trading at a substantial discount on an expectation that payment in full will not be forthcoming. The
composition relieves tbe near-term payment burden and averts tbe risk of default. Because default carries
collateral costs for the creditors and debtor botb, avoidance of default of itself can cause tbe price of tbe bonds
to increase. Each of Pakistan, Ecuador, and Ukraine successfully closed exchanges along tbese lines in tbe late
1990s. In the latter two cases, tbe price of tbe bonds went up twenty to thirty percent. Lipworth & Nystedt,
supra note 46, at 208. Argentina and Turkey followed in 2001. See Eichengreen, supra note 32, ch. 3.
71 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 14, at 766-67 (noting tbat in 1999 Ecuador included collaterized Bradies in
its restructuring, frustrating the market's expectation tbat tbe collateral implied a priority).
72 Lee C. Buchheit, Of Creditors, Preferred and Otherwise, INT'L FIN. L. REv., June 1991, at 12.
73 The rule was not absolute. Clark, supra note 29, at 861.
74 Buchheit, supra note 72, at 12-13.
75 Clark, supra note 73. at 861.
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defaulting debtors of the era tended not to have issued significant amounts of
bonded debt, and so found it convenient to exempt their bonds and maintain
76
their reputations in the bond markets. Secured debt, new credits, debt under
foreign exchange contracts, and debt subject to outside foreign guaranties also
tended to be exempted,77 as of course was debt owing to the IMP and Paris
78
Club members. The treatment accorded classes of trade creditors and short79
term lenders varied from case to case. As to the banks, there was no choice
but to default.
The practice of bondholder exclusion was exploited in the Brady
restructurings. The banks exchanged their illiquid loans for bonds, with the
80
bonds' liquidity and de facto prior status both seen as sweeteners. The story
even circulated that Brady Bonds were "default-risk-free" due to mandatory
prepayment clauses, sharing clauses, individual holder acceleration rights, and
8
the like. ! This was nonsense, of course. Any corporate bondholder could
have disabused actors in the sovereign market of the notion that payment and
enforcement clauses assure performance; the sovereign bond market itself
82
But financial
falsified the story with its histories of booms and busts.
optimism and the incredible stories it spawns prevailed for some years.
The bond priority story continued to be told as the bond market replaced
the banks as the primary source of emerging market debt capital during the
1990s. The story's implausibility became manifest: As bonded debt stock
grew in magnitude, its inclusion in restructuring became inevitable, whatever
83
the process frictions.
But, in the eyes of the market, falsification did not
occur until 1999, when, in connection with Pakistan's restructuring, the Paris
Club determined that the bondholders should be included along with other
84
creditors.
The same thing occurred soon thereafter with Ecuador and
Ukraine. All three exchange offers closed successfully,85 even as actors in the
76 Lee C. Buchheit, Cross-Border Lending: What's Different This Time?, 16 Nw. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 44,
49 (1995).
77 Clark, supra note 29, at 862-63.
78 See Gelpem, supra note 15, at 1127.
79 Clark, supra note 29, at 863.
80 See Buchheit, supra note 72, at 13.
81 Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 20.
82 Cf Buchheit, supra note 76, at 45-46 (describing bond market cyclicality).
83 [d. at 48-50.
84 Gelpem, supra note 15, at 1124-25.
85 Lipsworth & Nystedt, supra note 46, at 206. In the latter two cases, the price of the bonds went up
twenty to thirty percent because the markets, worried about holdouts, previously had doubted that the gain due
to restructuring could be accessed at aiL Such dramatic increases may not occur again. Henceforth, prices of
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bond market warned of higher borrowing costs for emerging markets due to
the loss of the assumed priority. 86 Meanwhile, defaulting sovereigns have
continued to make priority choices. Whereas Ecuador and Argentina defaulted
across the board, Russia, the Ukraine, and Pakistan limited their defaults to
s7
selected instruments.
Consider the implications of the choice between the broad and narrow
meanings of pari passu in the bond market prior to Pakistan's 1999
restructuring. The illusion of priority treatment still circulated, even as a
manifest risk of inclusion in restructuring grew with the bonded debt stock.
UACs made perfect sense in that context because they enhanced the
probability of exclusion by adding to the frictions of restructuring. The pari
passu clause, broadly read, did the same thing. Under it, a holdout excluded
from the payment stream by the sovereign could accelerate its own bond and
then use litigation to force its point. The better stocked the holdout's
contractual arsenal, the greater the likelihood of exclusion.
Now reconsider the narrow reading in light of the foregoing. It certainly
makes sense for the clause to cover the contractual and juridical priorities
identified by proponents of the narrow reading. But to restrict the clause's
reach to this limited class denudes it of most real world value because the
economically pertinent priorities in sovereign debt are de facto. To address
them, the clause must cover payment itself as well as priority of payment. In
the corporate debt context, in contrast, a bright line distinction between priority
and payment might make sense, because legal priorities affect the status of
classes of debt under bankruptcy reorganization plans long before any cash
88
crosses the table.
With sovereign debt, where there is no bankruptcy
reorganization, a bright-line distinction between priority and payment makes
little sense. Here, legally articulated priorities have no effect unless they
impact payment; payment and priority are the same thing.
2. The Tenns of the Composition

Now assume that the pari passu clause has not succeeded in its primary
purpose of contributing to a successful case for exclusion from restructuring.
bonds of sovereigns in impending distress will reflect the possibility of successful composition prior to the
exhaustion ofJiquidity. [d.
86 Gelpern. supra note 15. at 1124-25.
87 [d. at 1141. Ecuador initially excluded its Eurobonds even as it included its collaterialized Bradies.
The market did not stand for that. [d.
88 See II U.S.c. § I 129(b) (2000) (distinguishing between secured and unsecured debt).
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The sovereign has defaulted and no money will be paid until an exchange offer
has closed successfully. What role, if any, does the pari passu clause play at
this stage of the game? Finding an answer means first addressing a
preliminary question: Why do unpaid creditors voluntarily agree to take less
than they were promised, instead of waiting out the distress and insisting that
the renewed debtor make them whole in accordance with its original promises?
For a simple scenario in which the debtor plausibly can negotiate for a
reduction in interest rate or principal amount owing, assume an enforcement
model of sovereign debt. Assume also that the lenders have a costly
punishment available. Deployment of the punishment is cost-effective for the
lenders, but the expected yield is less than the principal and interest owed.
Given all of this, the borrower can come to the table with an offer of
compensation exchanged for the lenders' withholding of the sanction. As long
as the borrower offers more than the creditors' expected return from the
89
sanction, they will settle for less than they were originally promised. Further,
90
the creditors cannot credibly commit in advance to refuse to renegotiate.
Now switch to a reputational model. We still can posit that creditors
rationally might make concessions, even if the sovereign remains in distress.
The overhang of unpaid loans could discourage new public investment holding
out a possibility of high returns. If the forgiveness of some of the debt restores
the incentive to invest, it can be in the creditors' interest to make a concession.
The new investment benefits the sovereign's economy, making the debt
(valued after the concessions) worth more than it would have been worth
91
without the concessions and the new investment.
Generalizing, the sovereign can get the creditors to approve a composition
if the new debt it offers will have a market value greater than that of the
defaulted debt. Restructuring is feasible if the sovereign can offer a surplus.
For both the sovereign and the lenders, the restructuring negotiations address
the division of the surplus. The debtor comes to the table with some
bargaining power. Money has a time value, and the future state of the debtor's
economy remains uncertain even to creditors possessed of full information.
Both factors can make a deal holding out a resumption of payments highly
89 Eaton, supra note 51, at 50-51.
90 Conklin, supra note 51, at 493-94 (explaining Bulow's and Rogoffs model).
91 See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71
AM. EcON. REV. 393 (1981). This has been described as the "debt Laffer Curve," because forgiving part of
the debt dramatically increases the prospects for repayment of the remaining obligation. Kenneth Rogoff,
Symposium on New Institutions for Developing Country Debt, J. ECON. i'ERSP., Winter 1990, at 3, 5.
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attractive. Institutional concerns also can incline creditors toward acceptance.
In addition, the debtor may be able to take advantage of collective action
problems on the creditors' part, framing a low-ball offer with coercive terms.
Exit consents, along with the threat of delisting of the old bonds, further
92
enhance its position.
But the creditors also can wield bargaining power, particularly if they incur
the costs of organizing themselves. Waiting has an option value, so the debtor
cannot assume that any ()ffer holding out an increase in the price of bonds will
gamer sufficient support. Sweeteners may have to be added. These take many
forms: The interest rate on the restructured debt could be increased to
compensate for a repayment deferral;93 cash payments could be offered; the
new bonds could hold out enhanced liquidity; the terms of covenants could be
improved; third-party guarantees could be added; or "value recovery rights"
could be added, causing payment to be increased along with the performance
94
of a macroeconomic factor.
Upside kickers also have been devised: With
exchange warrants, the holders get an option to increase their participation;
with extension warrants, holders get an option to exchange for longer-maturity
95
instruments.
With such a restructuring negotiation in view as a possibility, reconsider
the choice between a UAC and a CAe. A rational bondholder might well opt
for a UAe. The question is whether the debtor will make a higher offer if all
the bonds have UACs than if all the bonds have CACs. There is reason to
96
think it will.
Given information asymmetries and different subjective
profiles, the creditors will have a range of upset prices respecting acceptance of
the debtor's offer. If the debtor needs one hundred percent or a supermajority,
it will have to increase its offer to meet the reservation prices at the higher end
97
of the creditors' range. The UAC thus counteracts the disorganized creditors'
tendency to cut and run to take a lowball offer. Of course, a UAC creates a
holdout problem even as it causes the offer to rise. But if the offer makes a

92 Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 25.
[d.
[d. at 8-9.
95 [d. at 8.
93

94

96 Bolton and Scharfstein suggest that the greater the number of creditors and the higher the percentage
of creditor votes needed to approve a renegotiation, the lower the debtor firm's surplus in the renegotiation.
Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 55, at 18.
97 This is the rule of downward-sloping demand. See generally Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other
Mysteries o/Corporate Finance, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1055 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really
Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990).
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generous split of the surplus, holdouts will not be so numerous as to threaten
the deal. No one ever expects one hundred percent participation in a
composition under UACs, yet such exchange offers close all the time under
UACs on the basis of supermajority acceptance. Ecuador recently got ninetyseven percent participation in an offer with an eighty-five percent minimum
98
participation requirement. Meanwhile, none of those complaining about the
holdout problem offers evidence that holdouts regularly cause exchange offers
99
to fail. When offers do fail, it may be that they are too low and as a result
attract something much less than a supermajority of creditors. 100
The standard negative pledge clause and the pari passu clause, broadly
read, also play a role in improving the creditors' hand at the negotiating table.
Suppose the sovereign owes $100 and claims to have the resources to support a
payment of only $50. The sovereign plays hardball, making a take-it-or-Ieaveit exchange offer of a substitute debt contract with a face amount of $50. The
creditors believe the sovereign can pay $70 and refuse to exchange. So the
sovereign goes another round, but this time makes the new debt, still with a
face amount of $50, senior to the debt in default. If the creditors do not have a
pari passu clause in their old bonds, they will be forced to accept the offer (at
least on an enforcement model of sovereign debt). The reason is that holding
out leaves the holder with a claim for $100 against an asset base that certainly
101
will be less than $50, because the new bonds get paid first. Alternatively, the
sovereign could have the new debt secured by a payment stream at its disposal,
at least as long as the old bonds have no negative pledge clauses. The addition
of seniority or security in the new issue imports an element of coercion-a
102
powerful incentive for the creditors to cave in and take half a loaf.

Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 25.
Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially
Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997) (showing that the holdout problem does not seem to be so severe as to
prevent the accomplishment of restructurings respecting private debt, particularly given use of coercive
devices like exit consents); see also Jean Helwege, How Long Do Junk Bonds Spend in Default?, 54 J. FIN.
341 (1999).
100 See Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes?, 66
J. Bus. 499 (1993) (studying fifty-eight consent solicitations in which an issuer of widely held debt requested
modification of existing covenants but did not request either interest deferral or principal forgiveness and
showing that in forty-two percent of the cases, the issuers sweetened the terms after an initial failure to obtain
consents).
101 Guillermo A. Calvo, Globalization Hazard and Delayed Reform in Emerging Markets, LACEA
Presidential Address 13 (Oct. 18, 2001), available at http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/jernil20021
trabaj02.pdf.
102 The classic corporate case involving such an offer is Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp.
198 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944).
98

99
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Because the bonds on offer in the preceding example benefited from a
formal priority, the creditors needed only the narrow reading of pari passu to
upset the coercive exchange offer (provided that, like Elliott in Belgium, they
found funds to attach or block). With a change of facts, they will need the
broad reading. In this version, in the second round, the sovereign makes the
same offer of $50. No priority is added to the new debt. The sovereign instead
drafts the new debt so that continuing default on the old debt triggers no
default on the new debt and announces its intention to make no payments on
the old debt until the new debt is paid in full. The sovereign also announces
that it will delist the old debt from the bond trading exchange, which threatens
the holders with illiquidity. Does a rational bondholder tender or not? The
103
new debt's priority now is de facto, but just as real.
The question whether to take the stingy $50 offer ultimately goes to the
credibility of the sovereign's threat not to pay the old debt. The threat has
credibility to the extent, first, the sovereign can gain renewed access to the
credit markets if the stingy exchange offer succeeds, and, second, the
sovereign finds continuing evasion of creditor enforcement actions by the old
bondholders cost beneficial. By tendering, the bondholder gets a bond worth
$50. If the bondholder refuses to tender but the offer succeeds, the old debt
loses its liquidity, and despite its face value of $100, may be worth less than
$50. If the bondholders organize and resist, they may be able to defeat the
offer and force the sovereign to pay more than $50. If they are disorganized,
the individual bondholder may be better off tendering. Meanwhile, the pari
passu clause, broadly read, diminishes the credibility of the sovereign's
nonpayment threat by expanding the class of possible ex post enforcement
actions. This makes it more likely that the sovereign will offer a fair division
of the surplus in the first place.
Of course, if the sovereign does make the fair offer of $70, an opportunistic
holdout can wield the pari passu clause, broadly read, in an attempt to get
$100. This disrupts the performance of the composition. But the sovereign is
not without recourse. Under the drafting pattern common until recently, all it
has to do is add to the offer an exit consent under which the pari passu clause

103 We see once more that with sovereign debt the distinction between "rank" and "payment" proves
soft; "rank" has no meaning unless it determines payments.
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A majority creditor vote will suffice to

C. Summary

Imagine an emerging-market financing closing in 1992 in New York.
Counsel for the borrower appreciates the problems bound up in UACs and pari
passu clauses, broadly read. So counsel drafts the bond contract with a CAC
and a pari passu clause that explicitly states that it covers only contractual and
positive law priorities and creates no rights with respect to disproportionate
payments made after default. The reason, counsel explains, is to reduce
frictions in a restructuring process that must follow in the wake of an external
shock to the borrower's economy. Unfortunately, counsel explains, such a
process would have to include the issue of bonds then in the process of
creation.
The hypothetical seems incredible for two reasons. First, in 1992, it was in
the interest of counsel's sovereign client for bond purchasers to proceed on the
assumption that the 1980s-pattern exclusion of bonds from restructuring would
continue to prevail. That assumption presumably impacted the rate of interest
on the bonds in the borrower's favor. Secondly, seeking to change the
standard form to rationalize its operation in the event of default would signal
negative information about the borrower's creditworthiness, impacting the rate
of interest on the bonds to the borrower's detriment.
To insist on the narrow meaning of pari passu today, now that the external
shock has occurred and restructuring frictions matter more than the terms of
the financing, arguably shifts a risk from the issuer back to the bondholder-a
risk previously priced, allocated, and paid for.
III. PARI PASSU AND BOND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Part I set out the case for the narrow reading of pari passu, and the case for
the broad reading followed in Part II. This Part works the conflicting
discussions through the analytical framework of bond contract interpretation.
This analysis proceeds in four stages: first, literal meaning; second, market
understanding; third, drafting burden; and fourth, purpose interpretation. The
104 Alternatively, the pari passu clause can be rendered ineffective by an amendment of the waiver of
sovereign immunity. See supra note 25.
105 Nothing need prevent the sovereign from doing the same thing with respect to the $50 offer.
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matter can be determined and concluded at any stage, cutting off further
inquiry.
A. Stage One: Literal Meaning
Contract interpretation starts with the literal word. The interpreter puts
herself in the shoes of an ordinarily reasonable person, making assumptions
respecting the reasonable person's usages and patterns of mind. 106 This
reasonable reader is assumed to employ standard English usage and interpret in
lo7
accord with its generally prevailing meaning. Such objective literalism holds
out advantages for the judicial decisionmaker: it is neutral and even-handed,
and distances the judge from responsibility for the result. It also limits the set
of evidentiary referents, simplifying adjudication. Objective literalism also
holds out advantages for contract parties. Of course, the party to a complex
contract never can know all of its literal implications; but literal interpretation
imports stability (if not certainty) even so. The bias toward literalism applies
with special strength in the interpretation of publicly traded debt. lOS Bond
contract forms are inspected repeatedly by experienced business lawyers who
I09
At the same time,
expect standard English usage to apply to their work.
literalism narrows the range of possible results, decreasing variance and
thereby enhancing trading value. I 10
1. The Meaning of "Pari Passu in Priority of Payment"
How does the reasonable reader of English interpret the phrase "rank at
least pari passu in priority of payment"? Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, in his
declaration on behalf of Elliott in its action against Peru, argued for a literal
interpretation as follows:
A number of articles have suggested that pari passu clauses, though
very common in sovereign loan agreements, do not mean what they
say, or cannot be relied upon by lenders if they are disregarded or
violated by borrowers .... I have no difficulty in understanding what
the pari passu clause means: it means what it says-a given debt will
rank equally with other debt of the borrower, whether that borrower
106 William W. Bratton, Jr., The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5
CARDOZO L. REv. 371,378 (1984).
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACfS § 202(3)(a) (1981).
lOS See, e.g., Broad Y. Rockwell In!'1 Corp., 642 F.2d 929,948·51 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981); Harris Y. Union Elee. Co., 622 S.W.2d 239,248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
109 Bratton, supra note 106, at 379.
110 See Broad, 642 F.2d at 942-43.
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is an individual, a company, or a sovereign state. A borrower from
Tom, Dick, and Harry can't say "I will pay Tom and Dick in full,
and if there is anything left over I'll pay Harry." If there is not
enough money to go around the borrower faced with a pari passu
provision must pay all three of them on the same basis. I I I
There is much to be said for Professor Lowenfeld's reading. Putting to one
side the problem of Latin translation, the stress in the standard clause appears
to lie on the word "payment" rather than on "priority." To a reasonable
English reader, "priority" sweeps up a range of phenomena, including
ordering in time, and the ordering of payments in time is what the broad
reading seeks to regulate.
The literal words also admit the narrow reading, however. Its proponents
move the stress to the words "rank" and "priority," arguing that the clause
targets status in respect of payment rather than payment itself. 112 The problem
is that the limitation, thus coaxed out of the literal words, does not make much
sense in the abstract. This forces the proponents to follow up with an elaborate
explanation of the salience of legal priority in the contracting context. 113 There
results a mandarin gloss, intelligible only by reference to generations of
practice lore. Because the matter at bottom concerns the meaning attached by
a bondholder rather than a bond lawyer, the narrow reading, while admitted by
the language, cannot prevail in a contest limited to the literal word. It needs
the further evidentiary support of a showing of market understanding.
The ensuing question is whether the broad reading, proposed as the literal
meaning, carries such objective weight as to foreclose further reference to
circumstance. Reference to circumstance can open the door to the conclusion
that ambiguity forecloses a stage one literal interpretation. At this point in the
analysis, the proponents of the narrow interpretation intervene successfully,
making a more than adequate case identifying an ambiguity in the language.
Once the contextual support for the narrow meaning is on the table, we see that
the standard pari passu clause easily can be read in accordance with it, making
a distinction between "rank in priority of payment," the status, and
"payment," the event. This is just the sort of showing that underscores the
shortcoming of aggressive literalism. Even as literalism holds out advantages,
III Lowenfeld Declaration, supra note I, 'Il'IlII-I2. For Professor Lowenfeld's updated Declaration, see
Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Declaration in the Matter of Cour d' Appel de Bruxelles, R.K. 240103, La
R€pubJique de Nicaragua contre LNC Investments LLC et Euroclear Bank, S.A.C., Jan. 27, 2004.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
I I3 See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
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if it precludes reference to context it can make things uncertain because
particularized and ascertainable market understandings often apply. As a
result, a door is held open for contracts, even bond contracts, to be read in
context. 114
At this point, the narrow reading's proponents make a literalist counterattack, based on the allocation of a burden of clarity. A careful drafter wanting
to assure attachment of the broad meaning might have added a confirmatory
reference to the act of payment: "pari passu in priority of payment ... and will
be paid as such." 115 A minority of pari passu clauses take this additional
step. I 16 The very existence of more specifically drafted clauses carrying the
broad meaning suggests a distinction between the clause's two forms. Under
this, bond contracts are sorted between those referring only to "priority of
payment," which would take the narrow reading, and those making a further
reference to the act of payment, which would take the broad reading. I 17
This ad hoc assignment of a burden of clarity does not, however, tell us the
meaning of the clause-in-chief. A contract that adds "payment" to "priority of
payment" does not by virtue of its own existence dictate the meaning of a
contract that only mentions "priority of payment." All it tells us is that the
drafter of the contract stating both phrases believes the form of the clause used
more generally to be vaguely and inadequately drafted, something we already
knew, and that that drafter wants to make sure the broad meaning attaches. We
are still left trying to ascertain the meaning of the more common form of the
clause. As to that, the phrase "priority of payment" unfortunately has no plain
meaning that determines the choice between the broad and narrow
interpretations. The sorting argument can win only at stage two or stage three.
At stage two, a court applying New York law brings to bear a standard of
market understanding, a standard that applies when publicly traded bonds are
interpreted. I 18 To sustain the posited distinction at this stage requires an
114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(\) (1981). For a bond case applying the rule, see
Buchman v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
lIS Lee C. Buchheit, The Pari Passu Clause Sub Specie Aetemitatis, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1991, at 12.
Buchheit also offers an even more elaborately drafted clause. Id.; see also Wood, supra note 29, at 373
(arguing that a judge should not attach the broad meaning unless words like "equal payment" or "equal
treatment" appear in the clause).
116 Italy's bonds provide an example: "We will pay amounts due on the debt securities equally and ratably
with all general loan obligations of Italy." Supplement to Prospectus, US $3,000,000,000 Republic of Italy
2.75% Notes Due 2006 (June 16,2003).
I 17 See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 886-87; Gulati & Klee, supra note 8, at 645.
118 Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048-51 (2d Cir. 1982), cut. denied,
460 U.S. 1Ol2 (\983).
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evidentiary showing that the sovereign bond market actually distinguishes
between contracts that do and do not expressly distinguish "priority of
payment" and "payment." Alternatively, a burden of clarity could be imposed
at stage three on a normative showing that the bondholders rather than the
issuer should have made things clearer.
2. Consistent Contracts, Counterfactuals, and Slippery Slopes

Reasonable persons draft internally consistent documents. The tradition of
literal interpretation accordingly rules that writings in a single transaction
should be interpreted together and that an interpretation giving effective
meaning to all terms of an agreement should prevail over an interpretation
leaving a part with an unreasonable or ineffective meaning. I 19 Proponents of
the narrow meaning contend that it leads to an internally consistent bond
contract that operates in harmony with the wider structure of the sovereign'S
obligations, while the broad meaning creates inconsistency and disharmony.
a. Other Obligations

It is argued that the broad reading makes no sense because, applied
literally, it prohibits the sovereign from making payments that everyone agrees
have to be made. These include payments to international financial institutions
(IFIs) like the IMF I20 and to trade creditors who provide necessary goods and
121
services-the police, the army, the hospitals, and the milkman.
IFIs demand and receive de facto priority. Private creditors accept this
because these last resort sources of credit tend to be beneficial. IMF bailout
122
And it is true that the pari passu clause
loans can even stave off default.
would be better drafted if it excepted these loans explicitly. But that
observation does not tell us how the clause applies to those loans. That the
clause does not mention IFI payments does not mean it is intended to cover
them, even though it literally could be read to cover them. Just about the only
thing that is clear about the clause is that it is not, and never has been,
scrupulously drafted. It follows that there is no reason to expect or demand
scrupulousness respecting IFIs.

119

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 202(1)-(2), 203(a) (1981).

120 Gulati & Klee, supra note 8, at 64 \.
121

Id.; Wood, supra note 29, at 373.

122

Bratton & Gulati, supra note II.
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Coming at this point from another direction, assume that the broad meaning
attaches. It does not follow that Elliott could use the clause to get a payment
headed to the IMF enjoined, even in Belgium. A convention of IMF priority
has prevailed in the market for a half century.123 Accordingly, under a market
understanding of interpretation, the standard clause does not cover the payment
to the IMF, and IFI payments can be excepted from the clause's reach at stage
two. And even if there were no market understanding, it is not clear why
Elliott would bother investing in the law suit-IFls have broad immunities,124
so an attachment probably would not lie.
As to the police protection in the streets and milk for the children, the
standard clause covers only "external indebtedness." This defined term tends
to cover only obligations in respect of money borrowed from abroad. 125
Neither trade credit (domestic or foreign) nor domestic obligations in respect
of borrowed money are covered. Note that even if they were covered the
promise would be effectively unenforceable because the only venues for
catching such payments would be the sovereign's domestic courts. Short-term
external borrowing facilities in support of trade for essential commodities
would be covered, but such coverage falls within the clause's essential
purpose: A sovereign that can trade as usual has a diminished incentive to
restart payment. Meanwhile, the milkman can be paid.
b. CounteJfactual Possibilities

If pari passu clauses are such good things under the broad reading, it is
asked why corporate debt contracts omit them. If rank and payment are the
same thing, must not Aunt Agatha refrain from paying the baker if she is
26
ignoring the butcher? Why does the bar tab omit a pari passu clausei
The reasons are twofold. First, before default, sovereign and private debt
are similar-no one insists on pari passu payment because different
obligations have different timetables and everyone's obligations are being
serviced timely. Second, after default, sovereign and private debt are radically
different. The bar owner, Aunt Agatha's butcher, and the corporate bondholder
are remitted to action at law against the bar customer, Aunt Agatha, and the
123

Gelpern, supra note 15, at 1122.
Id. at 1120.
125 See, e.g., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus, Government of Jamaica, 10.625% Notes Due 2017, at
58·59 (June 4, 2002) (defining external indebtedness to cover funds "borrowed or raised including
acceptances and leasing").
126 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 885-86.
124
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corporate bond issuer, respectively. Given severe distress, the bankruptcy
system provides a more user-friendly venue for enforcing equality and
constraining preferential payments to favored creditors than would resort to a
further action at law in the state courts under a pari passu clause. '27 Sovereign
creditors do not have these expedients, so their contracts include the pari passu
clause as a second-best (or maybe third-best) solution.
But why, it is asked, if the broad meaning attaches, did not enforcing
litigation occur earlier? After all, sovereign creditors have been receiving
haircuts in painful restructuring negotiations for decades even as other classes
of debt have been excepted, including, until recently, bonds. Because pari
passu clauses have been ubiquitous in debt contracts throughout the period, if
they were worth anything, someone should have gone to court to halt payments
. . I ' 128
10 VlO ahon.
The answer to this question lies in the institutional differences between
bank and bond-market lending. Members of bank lending groups operate
under cooperative norms enforced by reputational and regulatory constraints. '29 The normative framework includes, within the group, equal
130
treatment. If de facto priorities allocated by the defaulting sovereign present
a problem, group organization facilitates solution in the context of the
restructuring negotiations themselves. As the source of funding shifted from
the banks to the bond markets in the 1990s, observers warned that the days of
gentlemanly cooperation were over. They predicted that with proliferating
bondholding, litigation in the event of distress finally could be expected. 131
The prediction proved correct.
c.

Consistency

The proponents of the narrow reading, appealing to the rule of consistency,
point out that syndicated loan agreements usually contain a "sharing clause"
as well as a pari passu clause. It is argued that if the pari passu clause is
broadly read, these contracts cover the same function twice. If that is true, they
argue, the broad meaning makes no sense, because the sharing clause is

127
128
129
130

131

See supra note 39.
Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 884.
Buchheit, supra note 76. at 53-54.
See Buchheit & Reisner. supra note 24. at 504-05.
Buchheit. supra note 76. at 54.
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exhaustively negotiated and drafted, although the pari passu clause is complete
•
132
10 a sentence.
A number of responses can be made. First, belt-and-suspenders drafting is
not unusual in financial contracting. Second, the question of interpretation
arises in connection with bond contracts, not syndicated loan agreements.
Given the long, chameleon-like history of the pari passu clause, there is every
reason to suppose it might take on a different meaning in respect of a bond in
1995 than it had in respect of a 1975 bank credit facility, if only because in the
case of the bond de facto priority was entertained as an active possibility.
Third, the two clauses perform different functions. Sharing applies to the
lenders, constraining potential enforcement actions by individual banks for the
benefit of the other members of the lending group. The pari passu clause
covers the borrower's voluntary payment activity rather than the lenders'
enforcement activity, which by hypothesis puts the borrower in an involuntary
posture. The pari passu clause also reaches outside of a given issue's group of
holders to cover payments to all foreign private lenders. It also should be
noted that bond contracts differ from bank loan agreements in not traditionally
imposing sharing duties in respect of unilateral enforcement activity.133 With
bonds, the private law norm of reward to the diligent creditor prevails. 134 Thus
sovereign bond contracts permit a holder to accelerate its own bonds
unilaterallyl35 and private bond contracts permit a holder to sue individually for
missed payments.136 There does not appear to be any inconsistency.
d. The Slippery Slope

It is suggested that the broad reading makes the pari passu clause a
dangerous instrument-that it implies that all postdefault payments must be
pro rata across all creditors, whether benefited by the clause or not, and that it
132 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 884; see also Gulati & KIee, supra note 8, at 646, Gulati and KIee
also argue that the broad reading renders the negative pledge and acceleration clauses superfluous. I do not
understand these connections. As to mandatory payment clauses and turnover clauses, see supra note 29.
133 When the official sector suggested sharing clauses in sovereign bonds in 1998, the investor community
rejected it. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 884-85.

134

1 THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS §§ 6.18, 6.41 (2002)

(describing first-in-time priority to enforcing creditors); 2 id. § 16.10 (noting that outside of the delimited
bankruptcy recapture provision, preferential payments are not fraudulent conveyances and are not voidable).
135 See supra note 28.
136 Action by an indenture trustee of a private issue, in contrast, proceeds for the benefit of the group and
is subject to a different set of rules. See REVISED MODEL SIMPLIFIED INDENTURE §§ 6.07, 6.08 (2000)
(providing that holder can sue on its own bonds but that amounts collected by trustee be paid pro rata),
reprinted in 55 Bus. LAW. 1115 (2000).

HeinOnline -- 53 Emory L.J. 858 2004

2004]

PARI PASSU AND A DISTRESSED SOVEREIGN'S RATIONAL CHOICES

859

further implies a lack of finality with respect to any non-pro rata payment
received. A nonrecipient will have an action against the recipient of any non137
pro rata payment.
These are interesting but implausible interpretive speculations. The broad
reading supports the bondholder interest because it forces the sovereign either
to leave the bonds out of the restructuring or bring in all classes of debt
similarly situated, and because as long as default continues, it requires that any
payment made on foreign debt be made pro rata with respect to the debt
covered by the clause. At no point does the benefited bondholder make a
promise to reject or share a proffered payment not made pro rata; at no point
do any other claimants make or receive promises respecting payments. It
follows that no third party rights are created. It is difficult to imagine that a
court would make these extensions, even as it goes without saying that vultures
looking for deep pockets will assert third-party claims. 138
The foregoing should not be taken to assert that pari passu clauses, broadly
read, do not trigger difficult issues of application. They do, with the primary
questions concerning particular applications of a pari passu payment concept.
Assume that an exchange offer has closed, but that a holdout has procured a
judgment for principal plus accrued interest. The issuer now is ready to make
the first interest payment on the new bonds. What is pari passu treatment of
the holdout who no longer holds a bond but a judgment? Does the payment of
seven cents on the dollar on the new bonds mean the judgment creditor gets
paid one hundred cents on the dollar of its judgment? The clause itself
provides no answer.
B. Stage Two: Market Understanding

Proponents of the narrow interpretation contend that their reading has such
currency in sovereign debt markets as to conclude the matter under the
standard of market understanding. The narrow reading, they assert, embodies
"the market's collective memory of where [the clauses] originated and what
they were designed to achieve." 139 It is the "settled understanding" of

Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 885-86.
See Nacional Financiera, S.N.C. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2003 WL 1878415 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
2003) (holding that holder of debt covered by pari passu clause has no action against unrelated creditor
receiving a payment in violation).
139 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 918.
137

138
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practitioners in international debt markets,14O a meaning "accepted by general
consensus among market participants." 141
The discussion in Part II, with its explanation of the broad meaning's
economic functions, goes some distance in refuting this assertion because it
considers the interest of the bondholder rather than the memory of the bond
lawyer. Any remaining distance can be covered by a review of the legal
142
commentary. At least one commentator clearly accepts the broad reading.
The broad reading also at least appears to be within the contemplation of a
leading treatise writer. 143 Other discussants,l44 including the Emerging Market
Creditors Association (EMCA)/45 recognize the existence of an active
interpretive dispute and acknowledge that many lawyers, bankers, and
146
bondholders subscribe to the broad reading.
No less an authority than Lee
Buchheit, advancing the narrow meaning as one for which a "good case" can
47
be made/ has acknowledged that opinions differ on the clause's meaning:
One sometimes encounters an inquisitive borrower who asks why
this little breeze off the Tiber has ruffled through the pages of his
loan agreement. This is when the fun starts. "It means you can't pay
back somebody else's loan if you're not then current on your
payments under this loan," is how some bankers may explain it. "It
means you can't give a preference to some other creditor that you are
not at the same time giving to us," will be the interpretation offered
by others ....

Wood, supra note 29, at 372.
Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 889.
142 Brian W. Semkow, Syndicating and Rescheduling International Financial Transactions: A Survey of
the Legal Issues Encountered by Commercial Banks, 18 INT'LLAW. 869, 899 (1984).
143 Tudor John, supra note 40, at 96 ("[The clause] is intended to prevent the earmarking of revenues of
the government towards a single creditor; the allocation of foreign currency reserves, and generally against
legal measures which have the effect of preferring one set of creditors against the others or which discriminate
between creditors."). The passage can be read either way. The mention of "allocation of foreign currency
reserves" as a practice apparently separate from "earmarking" connotes a preferential payment. /d.
144 Reference also can be made to Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143
F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'd, 527 U.S. 308 (1999). This case was litigated from the Southern District of
New York through the Second Circuit to the Supreme Court and back on a preliminary remedies question.
The right asserted was to payment under a pari passu clause. Although the issue of interpretation was not
litigated, the parties in interest appear to have assumed that the broad reading attached.
145 Letter from Abigail McKenna on behalf of Board of Directors of EMCA, to Judge Thomas P. Griesa
(Jan. 14, 2004) (on file with author) (stating that "there are conflicting views among leading market
participants regarding the correct interpretation of the pari passu clause").
146 Buchheit, supra note 72, at II, 12; Gulati & Klee, supra note 8, at 645.
147 Buchheit, supra note 72, at 12.
140
141
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[T]he lender is not being told anything about where it will stand
in a queue of bankruptcy creditors. In the absence of this explanation
... a goodly number of bankers (and more than a few sovereign
borrowers) seem to believe that the pari passu covenant is there to
compel the borrower to pay all of its external debt on a ratable basis
(either in terms of the amount, or the timing, of debt service
148
payments) ....
Finally, we tum to the trenches, where standard bond contract language has
been redrafted in the past year or so. Actors working under 0-7 auspices have
devised new CACs adequate to the task assigned by the Treasury.149 Infonnal
pressures have resulted in the insertion of these clauses in New York
borrowings by Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, South Africa, and many other
countries. ISO The new CACs tend to pennit amendment of payment tenns on
approval of seventy-five percent of the bondholders. 151 The new fonns also tie
amendment or removal of their pari passu clauses to the seventy-five percent
ls2
supennajority figure.
Under earlier standard forms, pari passu clauses were
not mentioned specifically in the UAC and arguably were subject to
amendment or removal by a bondholder majority.IS3 Majority amendment
makes the clauses more vulnerable to removal by exit consent. The inclusion
of the pari passu clause in the territory covered by the new CAC supennajority
provision looks like a giveback: Even as the UAC is abandoned, the pari passu
clause gets more protection from removal in an exchange offer, being elevated
to equal dignity with the bond's payment tenns. If the drafters of the new
CAC attached the narrow meaning of pari passu, this innovation would not
make sense. Under the narrow meaning, the pari passu clause is only a
boilerplate technicality-a covenant covering a residual class of borrower
actions unlikely ever to implicate the value of the bonds. One would neither
expect such a provision to be singled out for removal by exit consent nor to be
protected by a supennajority amendment provision. The change in the
contracting pattern signals strongly that contemporary drafters either attach the

[d. at II, 12.
See Bratton & Gulati, supra note II.
150 John Barham, Cooking Up a New Solution, LATINFIN., June 2003, at 10. The list also includes Canada,
Turkey, Belize, Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela, and Korea. One exception to the trend is Israel, which used
UACs in its New York law registration. For a recent report on this front, see INT'L MONETARY FUND,
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE INT'L MONETARY AND FIN. COMM. ON CRISIS RESOLUTION (2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemaIlnp/pdr/cr/2003/eng/090503.pdf.
151 See Uruguay Exchange Offer, supra note 26, at 39.
148
149

152

[d.

153

The matter is not free from doubt. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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broad meaning or deem likely its attachment by a court applying a standard of
market understanding.
What the market understands, then, is that informed observers disagree
about the clause's meaning and that the dispute must be resolved in court.
Lawyerly precedents and practices do not of themselves dictate a case for the
narrow meaning.
C. Stage Three: Drafting Burden

Should not the proponent of the broad meaning bear a burden of clarity?
Or, alternatively, perhaps the borrower should bear the burden of clarity on the
ground that the narrow meaning is counterintuitive. Courts often decide
between disputed interpretations by assigning such a drafting burden. Once
the burden is imposed, the case is decided against the party bearing the burden.
This is an easy route to a decision and so is attractive to the court.
Where, in a case such as this, inquiry yields two plausible competing
interpretations, contract law, as a last resort,154 allows the invocation of the
canon of interpretation contra pro!erentem, or interpretation against the
drafter. 155 As counsel for the underwriters customarily drafts the bond
contract,156 this implies a burden on the bondholders, the underwriters being the
bondholders' predecessors in interest. Unfortunately, this approach lacks a
basis in reality in this case. With old standard language like this, there is no
drafter against which to construe.
If we were to go ahead anyway and allocate a drafting burden here, we
would do so on the ground that a given party's drafter should have clarified the
clause. But, as between the two parties to the sovereign debt contract, no
persuasive distinction can be drawn that allocates this responsibility, whether
based on culpability or capability. A question arises: Why, given this
background of controversy, would expensive lawyers put such a vague clause
in their contracts when a simple sentence would clarify matters? In fact,
sometimes getting the deal closed is both sides' highest priority. Vaguely
drafted clauses hold open a matter in dispute and avoid a negotiation standoff
157
that could disrupt the transaction's accomplishment.
As we have seen, a

154

3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACfS § 559 (1951).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACfS § 206 (1981).
156 See Stephen Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination
of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 990 (2004).
157 This is not uncommon in financial contracting. See Bratton, supra note 106, at 384-85.
155
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borrower's lawyer who insisted on a pari passu clause unambiguously
expressing the narrow meaning could disrupt lender expectations respecting
exclusion from restructuring and also could have been seen to signal hidden
information about pending distress. 158 A ·lender's lawyer seeking a clause
unambiguously expressing the broad reading could disrupt things too, given
the existence of a literature advocating the narrow reading and the tradition of
sovereign discretion respecting payment priorities. With a drafting tradition
going back decades and a market satisfied by a vaguely drafted clause,
incentives lie with leaving well enough alone. The drafting lawyers and their
clients consciously left the open question as to the meaning of pari passu to a
reviewing judge.
The law and economics notion of a penalty default does not prove helpful
either. Like the common law canon of interpretation against the drafter, the
penalty default applies when one party to the contract has superior information
and an incentive not to disclose it. 159 The penalty default puts the burden of
clarity on the party with the information advantage, prodding it to disclose. To
import this notion into the sovereign debt context puts the burden on the
borrower, for in a sovereign bond negotiation the borrower has superior
information about its own financial health and intentions respecting priorities
in the event of distress. But this is a crude route to an endorsement of the
broad meaning. A more sustained interrogation of the economic context is
needed.
Either proponent could have done a better job of drafting here. But neither
has greater fault. As between the two proponents and their respective clients,
there is no pertinent distinction that justifies allocation of an outcomedeterminative drafting burden.
D. Stage Four: Conflicting Purposes and Comparative Expectations
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bankl(IJ famously established a
standard of market understanding in bond contract interpretation. The market
understanding is to be applied as a matter of law, thus bypassing the jury as
well as subjective particulars concerning the contracting parties and their

See supra Part II.C.
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALEL.J. 87,127-30 (1989).
160 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983),
158

159
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intentions. 161 It tends to be forgotten, however, that the parties in Sharon Steel
proved no market understanding sufficient to decide the case. The court
instead balanced the interests at stake using a norm of least injury under
uncertainty as to meaning:
Where contractual language seems designed to protect the interests of
both parties and where conflicting interpretations are argued, the
contract should be construed to sacrifice the principal interests of
each party as little as possible. An interpretation which sacrifices a
major interest of one of the parties while furthering only a marginal
interest of the other should be rejected in favor of an interpretation
which sacrifices mar?,inal interests of both parties in order to protect
their major concerns. 62
A similar approach will be required in the interpretation of the pari passu
clause. As in Sharon Steel, the vagueness of the clause's language combines
with the noisiness of the background signals from the market to put the onus
on the judge. The case must be decided by reference to the purposes of the
contract language, the expectations of the parties, and the values at stake.

Sharon Steel's norm of least injury is backward-looking-it focuses on
existing contracts and the allocation of sunk costs among the parties to those
contracts, without asking questions about future effects and incentives.
Efficiency considerations usually dictate a forward-looking approach. Is
Sharon Steel's norm by implication inefficient? No, because bond contract
interpretation is a subject matter that tends to implicate only wealth allocation
respecting past transactions. The future presents less reason for concern than
usual in this context because the next generation of contracts always can be
rewritten. Once a definitive New York law opinion has been rendered
respecting pari passu, the interpretation it attaches becomes the focal point for
the market's understanding. New bonds will be priced to reflect the attendant
risks. If the market decides that the judicial reading does not suit its purposes,
the drafters of future contracts can reverse the result by redrafting so as to
reflect whatever meaning they wish to attach. Of course, path dependencies or
163
other frictions could retard such an adjustment.
But that worry does not
seem cognizable here, given recent market movement toward CACs after a

See id. at 1048-51.
Id. at 1051.
163 For the view that network effects can retard the responsiveness of standard bond contract forms, see
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The
Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713 (1997).
161

162
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century's use of UACs.
Accordingly, absent a showing that one reading is
clearly superior to the other reading in respect to the future of the sovereign
bond market, the judge safely can dispense with prospective implications and
concentrate on the parties to the transaction in question and all similar past
transactions.
As to existing contracts, the outcome will follow from the temporal
perspective chosen, ex ante or ex post. An ex ante perspective favors the broad
reading. Here the purposes of the parties are fixed as of the time of
contracting, by hypothesis during the optimistic days of the early 1990s. At
that time, as we have seen, the 1980s restructuring pattern still signaled de
facto priority treatment for bonds. Issuers took advantage of this impression
and pari passu clauses figured into the illusion of priority. The contract price
presumably reflected that expectation.
An ex post point of view situates expectations at the time of default, and, at
least in the case of Argentina, recognizes the fact that restructuring implies
daunting process barriers. The balance of interests arguably tips to the narrow
interpretation.
The primary original purpose-the assurance of the
continuance of the 1980s practice of excluding bonds from restructuring-has
failed. There is simply too much bonded debt to allow its effectuation. That
being the case, the bondholders' best interests lie in a smooth restructuring
process. After all, a composition only succeeds if the debtor holds out a
surplus (assuming the bondholders manage to organize). The broad reading
makes possible after-the-fact disruption of the composition and, thus, interferes
with the bondholder majority's pursuit of the surplus. Now, it is true that the
broad reading also assists the bondholders as they bargain for the largest
possible share of the surplus. But the bondholders are not without contractual
assistance here, for all 1990s sovereign bond contracts issued in New York
contain UACs.
The proponent of the broad reading is not without an argument at this
stage: The threat of disruption may be overblown. Pakistan, Ecuador, and
Ukraine show that sovereign debt restructurings can work in this bondholder
era. 165 Holdouts have not been a problem. Credible exchange offers have to
put value on the table. Bondholders, including vultures, have tended to grab
the value and have avoided costly enforcement actions. Furthermore, pari
passu clauses are vulnerable to removal by exit consent. The vulture problem
164

165

See Choi & Gulati, supra note 156 (describing these developments in detail).
See Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 26-27.
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seems to concern not debt issues in recent compositions but old paper-either
defaulted issues as to which no composition ever was attempted or Issues
subjected to restructuring prior to use of the exit consent device.
At no point in this analysis does the narrow reading attach because
"priority of payment" means only legal priorities. The narrow reading
commends itself on the assumption that it assists a bondholder majority in
accessing a payment stream that is value-maximizing in the restructuring
context. Payments are the only things that really count with sovereign debt.
IV. CONCLUSION

Under this Article's interpretation of pari passu, a court legitimately can
attach the narrow meaning, but only to the extent that it has been persuaded
that process frictions pose an unduly costly barrier to sovereign debt
restructuring and so attaches the narrow meaning as a means to the end of cost
reduction.
An oddity in this interpretive approach must be admitted. It implies that
pari passu meant one thing (broad reading) in a new issue of Argentine bonds
in 1994 and another thing (narrow reading) in the same bonds in 2004, given
default. It also implies that pari passu might revert to the broad meaning in a
new sovereign issue containing a CAC that sweeps the pari passu clause into
the supermajority amendment regime-as we have seen, this drafting
development signals a preference for the broad reading. Although the meaning
of the pari passu clause does have chameleon-like properties, this seems to go
too far.
Interpretation that is dynamic over time makes perfect sense in this context.
To see why, compare private debt contracting once again. With private debt,
distress means bankruptcy, and one purpose of bankruptcy is to put most of the
carefully drafted terms in the debtor's bond contracts into the paper shredder.
Although the contracts are drafted with a view to debtor distress and are
designed to protect the creditor's enforcement interest in the event of distress,
they turn out to be value-destructive to both the debtor and the creditor when
severe distress actually occurs. The result is a value-conserving intervention
by the state in the form of a contract-avoiding bankruptcy regime. Economists
are only beginning to articulate theories that explain the contradiction between
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the ex ante rational form of the debt contract and the same contract's ex post
. 166
dys f unctIOn.
The point for present purposes is clear enough: The shift to the ex post in
the interpretation of the pari passu clause follows from the fundamentals of the
debtor creditor relationship. Where normally an ex ante timeframe should
guide contract interpretation, so as to protect values freely allocated by the
contracting parties from opportunistic ex post recapture, temporal perspectives
work differently with debt, distress, and composition. Recognition of the
tension between the ex ante and ex post creditor interest also helps explain why
bond lawyers have for decades perpetuated a badly drafted clause. The
problem continues with the new CACs. If a definitive judicial ruling attaches
the narrow meaning, today's drafters face the problem of redrafting the pari
passu clauses in the new CACs so as to make it clear that the broad meaning is
intended. If they do that, however, they tie their own bondholders' hands in
the event that severe distress makes composition a favored outcome and
holdout disruption too costly.
The solution lies in a sovereign bankruptcy regime. The same economics
that cause the pari passu clause to raise an intractable issue of contract
interpretation demonstrate the bankruptcy of the U.S. Treasury's contractarian
approach. There is no perfect debt contract that is efficient in bad times as
well as in good.

166 See Ernst·Ludwig von Thadden et aI., Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy (Nov. \9,
2003) (unpublished manuscript). at http://papers.ssm.com!so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=44051.
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